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1. Introduction 
Increased international market integration –also known as globalization-has 
affected significantly the design and the scope of fiscal policy.  Focusing on factor 
income taxation, theory suggests that international factor mobility leads national 
government, in an attempt to attract mobile factors, to cut the tax rate on the relatively 
mobile factors- capital- and increase the tax burden fallen on the relative immobile 
factors (see e.g. Wildasin, 1988; Persson and Tabellini,1992).1  
Although there is a large number of empirical studies examining the effect of 
increased international market integration on national tax policy, the results of the 
relevant literature appears to be highly inconclusive. Regarding capital taxation, a branch 
of the empirical literature concludes that higher international market integration is 
associated with higher capital taxes (see e.g. Garrett, 1995; Quinn, 1997; Swank, 1998) 
whereas another strand provide empirical evidence of a negative impact of globalization 
on capital tax rates (see e.g. Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Winner, 2005; Bretschger, 
2010).  
Contradicting findings are mainly attributed to particular choices made by the 
researchers concerning the measurement of capital taxation and globalization. 
Specifically, a large part of the relevant literature shares the view that employing average 
effective tax ratios (AETR) based on the Mendoza et al (1994) approach or statutory tax 
rates instead of tax revenues as a share of GDP, may give rise to different findings.2 
                                                 
1The possibility that competition across national jurisdictions in order to attract capital results in 
inefficiently low tax rates and public good provision dates back to Oates (1972). However, the “benchmark 
tax competition model” has been first articulated by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). 
For surveys on international tax competition literature see Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and 
Haufler (2001). 
2 For example Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Adam and Kammas (2007) and Plumper et al. (2009) argue 
that studies employing effective tax rates, find a negative impact of globalization on capital taxation and 
therefore verify the validity of the efficiency hypothesis, while studies relying on tax revenues (either as a 
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Moreover, it is widely believed, that employing corporate profits instead of capital tax 
revenues as a proxy of capital taxation may be of crucial importance concerning the 
obtained results (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2002 ; Kammas, 2011)  
Finally, a large strand of the literature places the spotlight on the alternative 
globalization measures employed and suggests that employing some specific indexes of 
globalization instead of others may be of crucial importance regarding the obtained 
empirical findings (see e.g. Bretschger and Hettich, 2005; Dreher, 2006). This is because 
globalization consist a highly multifaceted phenomenon and alternative proxies highlight 
different aspects of it. For example, alternative globalization measures based on actual 
flows (e.g. international trade (percent of GDP) or FDI (percent of GDP)) may better 
reflect international economic integration on goods market whereas the capital account 
restrictions index developed by Quinn (1997) mainly focus on international capital 
market integration and the KOF index of globalization developed by Dreher (2006) may 
better capture the various political and social features of globalization.  
The above mentioned contradicting empirical findings form the motivation of the 
present paper. The present paper aspires to examine the results obtained by different 
empirical studies and to relate them to the particular characteristics of the underlying 
studies. To this end, we proceed by making an analytical review of the relevant literature 
and then we perform a meta-analysis by employing data from a total number of 23 
different empirical studies. Meta-analysis allows us to summarize the main results of the 
literature in a systematic way, investigate the presence of biases and examine how 
particular choices made by the researchers affect the results and therefore to highlight the 
potential systematic impact of data, specifications or estimation procedures on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
share of GDP or as a percentage of total taxation) share the view that corporate taxation is positively 
associated with market integration and hence seem to reject the efficiency hypothesis. 
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reported findings. Thus, the main objective of the present paper is to examine 
systematically the factors that explain the heterogeneity in the literature and the potential 
impact of study characteristics on the relationship between taxation of capital and 
globalization. 
Our main results are as follows. We find that study characteristics related to the way 
capital taxation is measured do not exert any systematic impact on the obtained results 
whereas, study characteristics related to globalization measures give rise to totally 
different findings concerning the relationship between globalization and capital tax rates. 
More precisely, studies employing: (i) international trade as percent of GDP and (ii) the 
globalization index developed by Quinn (1997) are more likely to report a negative 
impact of international market integration on capital taxation, whereas studies employing 
the KOF index of globalization developed by Dreher (2006) are more likely to report a 
positive effect of globalization on capital tax rates. Moreover, we provide empirical 
evidence that several other study characteristics (like the journal the paper was published, 
the publication year and the sample employed) do have systematic impact on the reported 
results. 
The structure of the paper emerges along the following lines; in the next section, we 
present the theoretical considerations and data issues; in section 3, we proceed by making 
a detailed review of the relevant literature and we discuss the methodology followed in 
order to code the empirical studies and to construct the meta-sample employed; in section 
4, we present the meta-analysis and the results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
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2. Globalization and Capital Taxation: Theoretical considerations and data issues 
  
2.1 Do capital taxation measures matter? 
A major problem in the empirical studies examining the determinants of capital 
taxation is how to approximate the tax burden on capital. The simple measure of statutory 
tax rate cannot capture the complexity of the whole tax system nor provide a clear image 
of the implied tax policy. Since the overall tax burden does not depend solely on the 
statutory tax rate, but also on what is defined - by the tax legislation - as tax base, 
researchers are in need of some more sophisticated tax measures that take into account 
changes in the tax base (changes in allowances, deductions e.t.c). For these reasons there 
are various alternative measures employed as proxies of the tax burden on capital. 
Namely; (i) the AETR based on the methodology of  Mendoza et al. (1994), (ii) the 
capital tax revenues as a share of GDP or as a percentage of total taxation, (iii) the AETR 
and marginal (METR) effective tax rates based on the methodology of Devereux et al. 
(2002).  
A large branch of the literature shares the view that alternative measures of the tax 
burden give rise to different results with respect to the impact of globalization on capital 
taxation. Specifically, it is believed that studies employing effective tax rates, tend to 
verify a negative impact of globalization on capital tax rates (see e.g. Bretschger and 
Hettich, 2005; Winner, 2005; Bretschger, 2010) while studies relying on tax capital 
revenues (either as a share of GDP or as a percentage of total taxation) tend to confirm a 
positive impact of market integration on capital taxation (e.g. Garrett, 1995; Quinn, 1997; 
Swank, 1998). According to this view, different results can be attributed to the fact that 
the capital tax revenue proxy misleadingly presents possible changes in the tax base (that 
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may be driven by changes in the rate of profitability or the size of corporate sector) as if 
they are changes in the tax burden (Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Adam and Kammas, 
2007).3 
In addition, a large number of scholars tend to believe that employing corporate 
profits and capital gains as proxy of the capital tax base may be of crucial importance 
regarding the obtained results. To their view, corporate profits comprise the most mobile 
form of capital –relative to real estate property, operating surplus of private 
unincorporated enterprises e.t.c- and therefore taxes on corporate profits are affected in a 
greater extend by international market integration (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2002 ; 
Kammas, 2011) 
 
2.2 Do international market integration measures matter? 
Another debatable issue is how to better approximate international market 
integration. Since globalization consist a multifaceted phenomenon, each measure 
captures at best some specific features of it. For example, market integration measures 
based on actual flows of trade (e.g. international trade as percent of GDP) may better 
reflect international economic integration on goods market whereas the globalization 
index developed by Quinn (1997) can better capture international capital market 
integration. Similarly, the KOF index of globalization developed by Dreher (2006) can 
                                                 
3 More precisely, the relevant literature concludes that in the last decades, the share of corporate profits in 
GDP has increased substantially in most OECD economies (see e.g. Devereux, Griffith & Klemm, 2004). 
This shortcoming (namely, that higher tax revenue are due to larger tax bases rather than higher tax rates) 
seems to be behind the positive relationship between higher economic integration and corporate tax 
revenues found in the data. Moreover, the proxy for tax revenues as a share of GDP is not the appropriate 
decision variable of the government. This is because the government is able to determine - through tax 
legislation - the statutory tax rate and the tax base but not GDP. 
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better capture the various political and social features of globalization. Therefore, 
employing one measure instead of another may give rise to different empirical findings. 
Following this rationale, Dreher (2006) highlights the importance of employing 
indexes that are based on specific dimensions of globalization instead of using more 
general proxies. Specifically, Dreher (2006) argues that general globalization measures 
(e.g. actual flows of trade and investment) fail to reflect in a clear cut way the level of 
economic integration since they are unavoidably affected by forces of political and social 
integration. This shortcoming appears to be of great importance in the case of capital 
taxation because political and economic integration exert conflicting forces on capital tax 
rates. Namely; tax burden fallen on capital is expected to decrease with increased 
economic integration (due to the tax competition efficiency hypothesis) whereas it is 
expected to rise with increased political and social integration (due to increased 
international tax cooperation between national governments). Therefore, employing a 
composite index of globalization instead of a more specific one may give rise to totally 
different empirical findings.  
Moreover, many studies underline the potential endogeneneity problem between 
some globalization measures based on actual flows of trade and investment and capital 
taxation. This problem arises because increased international capital and trade flows in a 
country can be viewed either as a proxy of market integration or as the result of reduced 
capital tax rates. In order to overcome the above mentioned endogeneity problem, many 
scholars choose to employ qualitative indexes of market integration like the one 
developed by Quinn (1997) or alternatively the KOF economic integration index 
developed by Dreher (2006) which is also based –to some extend- on qualitative features 
of globalization.  
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For all the above reasons, a large strand of the empirical literature shares the view 
that employing specific indexes of globalization instead of others may be of crucial 
importance regarding the obtained empirical findings 
 
3. Review of the literature and Construction of the meta-sample. 
Section 3.1 presents a review of empirical studies on capital taxation and 
globalization. Ee consider all empirical studies that include capital taxation on the left-
hand side of the equation and a measure of international market integration on the right-
hand side. Section 3.2, describes in details how we proceeded in order to construct the 
meta-sample which in turn served as a basis for our meta-analysis. 
 
3.1 Review of the Literature 
One of the first empirical studies examining the impact of international market 
integration on capital taxation is that of Garrett (1995), which employs a panel of 15 
OECD countries over the period 1967-1990 and examines how the interaction between 
domestic political forces (e.g. ideology of cabinet) and the economic forces of market 
integration may affect the implemented fiscal policy. Concerning the issue of capital 
taxation, Garrett (1995) employs as dependent variable capital tax revenues as a share of 
GDP and investigates the impact of increased international trade as percent of GDP. The 
study provides empirical evidence of a positive impact of increased international trade on 
capital tax burden.  
A number of subsequent articles extended in various ways the analysis conducted by 
Garrett (1995) by keeping as dependent variable the share of capital tax revenues to GDP. 
Quinn (1997) employs a panel 37 countries from 1974 to 1989 in order to investigate the 
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same relationship. The basic advantage of Quinn (1997) is that it develops a totally novel, 
qualitative measure of market integration which is strictly focused on capital market 
liberalization. Empirical findings provide additional evidence that capital market 
integration exerts positive and significant impact on capital tax rates. Similarly, Swank 
(1998) employing a panel data for 17 advanced countries over the period 1966-1993, 
concludes that increased market integration is positively associated with corporate 
taxation –when capital mobility is either measured as actual capital inflow and outflow as 
a share of GDP or captured by the liberalization index developed by Quinn (1997) – 
whereas it is negatively associated whenever it is measured as international trade (imports 
plus exports) as a share of the GDP. Finally, Slemrod (2004) using a panel of 55 
countries over the period 1980-1995, shows that openness is negatively associated with 
statutory tax rates but positively associated with revenues collected as a fraction of GDP. 
Strikingly, larger and more trade-intensive countries do collect more corporate tax 
revenues. To our knowledge, the only study that employs as dependent variable capital 
tax revenues as a share of GDP and provide empirical evidence in favor of the so-called 
“efficiency hypothesis” (i.e. a negative impact of market integration on capital taxation) 
is that of Kenny and Winer (2006) which is based on a panel of 12 OECD countries over 
the 1975-1992 period. 
Although most of the “first generation” empirical studies are employing capital tax 
revenues as a share of GDP as dependent variable, a large number of subsequent articles 
criticize heavily the use of this measure. Bretschger and Hettich (2002) argue that the 
positive association between globalization and the tax burden on capital found in the 
previous studies can be attributed to the fact that changes in the capital tax revenue may 
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be due to changes in the tax base (instead of changes in the tax burden of capital) and 
argue in favor of alternative proxies for the tax burden on capital (i.e. AETR). 
One of the first studies employing AETR as dependent variable is that of Rodrik 
(1997). In a dataset of 18 OECD countries from 1965 to 1991 he concludes that increased 
market integration –measured as international trade as percent of GDP- is negatively 
associated with the taxation of capital. A large number of subsequent articles extended 
the analysis of Rodrik (1997) in several ways and provide additional evidence in favor of 
the “efficiency hypothesis”. Bretschger and Hettich (2002, 2005) using AETR as 
dependent variable, for a set of 12 OECD countries over the 1967-1996 period, verify the 
negative impact of globalization on corporate tax rates. Their results remain qualitatively 
intact under alternative specifications and for different international market integration 
measures. Qualitatively similar findings are also obtained by other studies employing 
AETR as a proxy of capital taxation: Winner (2005) employing a wider dataset of 23 
OECD countries over the period 1965-2000, and various alternative market integration 
proxies, provide strong evidence in favor of the “efficiency hypothesis”. These findings 
are also verified in Adam and Kammas (2007). On the other hand, Bretschger (2010) 
argues that the positive effect of increased international trade on economic growth is due 
to its negative effect on capital taxation: using a dataset of 12 OECD countries in the 
period 1965-1999 he provides evidence for the hypothesis that trade increases growth 
through its curbing effect on capital taxes. The analyzed trade-growth channel includes a 
negative impact of openness on corporate taxes and a negative effect of taxes on capital 
formation and growth. Similarly, Hays (2003) employing a panel dataset of 17 OECD 
countries (1965-1996) and three alternative measures of capital mobility, concludes that 
increased international capital mobility has a strong negative impact on capital tax rates 
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in capital rich countries with majoritarian political institutions. Finally, Kammas (2011) 
provides empirical evidence of a negative and significant relationship between 
international trade and four alternative effective tax ratios by employing a panel dataset 
of 20 OECD countries over the 1982-2000 period. 
However, the use of AETR as dependent variable does not preclude empirical 
evidence against the “efficiency hypothesis”. Dreher (2006) in a panel dataset of OECD 
countries over the period 1970-2000, shows that greater globalization leads to higher 
AETR on capital. The globalization measure employed by Dreher (2006) (the so- called 
KOF index of market integration) besides the economic factors (e.g. trade, capital 
restrictions, trade barriers) takes also into account the social and the cultural aspects of 
integration. The results documented therein provide evidence in favour of a positive and 
significant influence of globalization on corporate AETR therefore rejecting the 
“efficiency hypothesis”. Similar findings are also obtained by Garrett and Mitchell (2001) 
for a sample of OECD countries from 1967 to 1992 leading them to conclude that: (i) 
foreign direct investment, (ii) financial openness index and (iii) covered interest rate 
differentials are all associated with higher AETR on capital. Similarly, Gelleny and 
Mccoy (2001) using a panel data set comprised of 17 OECD countries for the years 1982-
1991 suggest that openness is  positively associated with corporate tax ratio AETR and 
attribute this finding to the inhibiting effect of national borders on trade. Additionally, 
exposure to trade may heighten pressure on governments to provide compensation to 
segments of the population displaced by international competition (Rodrik, 1998). Such 
compensation may be financed by increased corporate taxes. Following similar rationale 
and employing a panel of fourteen developed democracies countries from 1981 to 1995, 
Swank and Steinmo (2002) investigate what drives the remarkable change in 
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contemporary tax policy in capitalist democracies. They conclude that 
internationalization, domestic economic change, and budgetary pressures each prompt 
significant changes in tax policy yet, together, they create a system of constraints altering 
the level and distribution of tax burden. Regarding the impact of market integration on 
capital taxation, they find that both capital mobility and trade are associated with cuts in 
statutory corporate tax rates but not with reductions in effective average tax rates on 
capital income.  
 
3.2 Meta-sample and methodology. 
Empirical studies examining the effect of international market integration on capital 
taxation are published either in economics or in political science journals. Therefore, in 
order to construct our meta-sample we proceeded by searching in the following 
databases: (i) the Econ-Lit (The American Economic Association’s electronic 
bibliography) database4 in order to find articles published in economics’ journals and (ii) 
the Scopus database5 in order to find the articles published in political science journals. 
Our objective was to find articles containing at least one empirical estimate of 
globalization’s impact on capital taxation. The keywords used in the search were “capital 
+ taxation”, “globalization”, “efficiency + hypothesis”.6 These approaches identified 
more than 150 papers, where 23 empirical studies were included.7 These studies form our 
                                                 
4 Econ-Lit is a comprehensive index of journal articles, books, book reviews, collective volume articles, 
working papers and dissertations 
5 Scopus is a multi-disciplinary database covering science, engineering, medicine, and social sciences. It 
provides access to: Citations and abstracts of over 18,000 titles (1966 - present) from 5,000 international 
publishers and cited references of articles published since 1996 
6 The last search was conducted on May 5, 2011. 
7 A large number of the identified papers were theoretical, whereas there were cases of empirical studies 
which although they investigate the effect of international market integration on national tax structure, they 
employ as key dependent variable some kind of capital tax-labor tax ratio and not a clear cut capital tax rate 
measure (see e.g. Haufler et al., 2009). Therefore, these empirical studies are not included in our meta-
sample.  
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meta- sample. As each study reports several estimations, we follow Doucouliagos and 
Stanley (2009) and report them all as independent regressions and thus our sample 
includes 233 observations. Table 1 lists the 23 studies employed in our analysis as well as 
some descriptive statistics concerning the estimated coefficient of the size effect of 
globalization on capital taxation.  
 
[Insert Table 1, here] 
 
As can be easily verified, there exist meaningful variation among the empirical 
studies. Firstly, the number of coefficients obtained from each study ranges significantly. 
That is, although we obtain a relative large number of observations from some studies 
(for example Dreher, 2006, with 58 reported coefficients) others contribute by providing 
a relatively small number of estimated coefficients (Garrett, 1995 with only 2 reported 
coefficients). Secondly, there exists significant variation in the mean value of 
coefficients, ranging from a value of -7.509 (Bretschger and Hettich, 2002) to 1.141 
(Hays, 2003). Moreover, examining the “minimum”, “maximum” columns we conclude 
that seventeen out of the twenty two studies report at least one positive coefficient, 
although most of the coefficients appear to be negative.  
The simplest meta- analysis model regresses the reported estimated coefficient of 
each study (i.e. the estimated effect of globalization on the tax rate on capital) weighted 
by its standard error - i.e. the t- statistic of each study- over an intercept and the inverse 
of the standard error of the coefficient.8 Then, in the absence of heterogeneity in the 
                                                 
8 The variables are weighted with the standard error in order to correct the meta- regression model for its 
build- in heteroskedasticity problem (see Stanley et al., 2008 for more details).  
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literature, the coefficient of the inverse of the standard error is the “true” or underlying 
effect (Stanley et al., 2008).    
The estimated “true” effect however can be biased in the presence of (i) publication 
bias and (ii) unexplained heterogeneity (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2008). Publication 
bias arises in the literature when editors, reviewers and researchers have a preference for 
results that are statistically significant and/ or consistent with certain theoretical 
predictions (Stanley, 2005; Doucouliagos, 2005). Our testing for the presence of 
publication bias rejected the hypothesis of publication bias in all cases, and we therefore 
need not correct our results.  
In order to tackle the problem of heterogeneity in the meta- regression we have to 
introduce additional meta- independent (moderator) variables.9 The moderator variables 
are those particular studies characteristics that are expected to have systematic impact on 
the reported effect of globalization on capital taxation. Following the rationale described 
in Section 2 we seek to examine whether differences regarding: (i) capital taxation data 
and (ii) alternative globalization measures may be of crucial importance regarding the 
obtained results.  
In order to capture the effect of alternative capital taxation data we construct two 
dummy variables. The first one (denoted as AETR) equals to one whenever an estimation 
employs as proxy of capital taxes, average effective tax rates based either on the 
Mendoza et al. (1994) methodology or on Devereux et al. (2002); the second variable 
(denoted as statutory) equals to one whenever an estimation uses statutory tax rates as a 
measure of capital tax rates and takes a value of zero otherwise and the third (denoted as 
EMTR) equals to one whenever an estimation employs marginal effective tax rates based 
                                                 
9 In the meta- regression, these moderator variables are also divided by the standard error of the coefficient. 
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on Devereux et al. (2002) methodology as proxy of capital taxation. Moreover, in order 
to examine whether employing strictly corporate tax revenues instead of capital tax 
revenues as a proxy of capital taxation may be important, we construct the variable 
Corporate_data, which equals to one whenever an estimation uses exclusively corporate 
profits and capital gains as proxy of the capital tax base.  
Following similar rationale, in order to capture the effect of different globalization 
measures we create four alternative international market integration dummy variables. 
The first one (denoted as Openness) equals to one whenever an estimation employs actual 
international trade flows as percent of GDP and equals to zero otherwise; the second 
(denoted as KOF) takes a value of one when an estimation uses the overall KOF 
globalization index developed by Dreher (2006) and equals zero otherwise; the third 
(denoted as Quinn) equals to one when an estimation employs the qualitative index of 
market integration developed by Quinn (1997). Finally, as there is a number of papers 
that uses more indirect measures of globalization, such as the Sachs-Werner openness 
index, the covered interest parity or the savings- investment correlation (see e.g. Slemrod, 
2003; Winner 2005; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001) we construct a forth dummy variable 
(denoted as Indirect) which equals to one when one of the three above mentioned indirect 
globalization measures is employed and takes a value of zero otherwise. 
Moreover, we focus on the particular characteristics of underlying studies and we 
examine whether there exist potential systematic impact of specifications and estimation 
procedures on the reported findings. On this basis, we develop several additional 
moderator variables, which are presented in table 2. These variables were chosen firstly 
on the basis of theoretical judgments concerning the importance of each variable as 
highlighted in the literature and secondly following the “general to specific” approach as 
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it is common practice in the meta- analysis research (Stanley, 2005). Moreover our 
decision to keep or drop a variable from the model was also based on model diagnostics 
(namely improvement of the R- square and the Ramsey Reset specification test).  
 
[Insert Table 2, here] 
 
The full set of moderator variables includes initially variables that take into account 
the structure of the dataset, i.e. the earliest and latest year and the number of countries 
included in the sample. It is also includes the year of publication and a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the journal where the article was published is not indexed in 
the Econ- Lit. Finally dummies are included in order to account for the other independent 
variables included in each regression: the dummy variable dynamic, which takes the 
value of one if lagged tax rate on capital is included in the equation, dummy spending to 
take into account if the author(s) control for the level of government spending, and the 
dummy demographics to take into account if the author(s) control for demographic 
factors. 
The meta- regression model we estimate then (taking account the study 
heterogeneity) takes the form  
 
 ( ) 0
1
1
K
k jk
i i j
k j
a Z
Tstat a SE v
SE
β
=
= + + +∑  (1) 
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Where, Tstati and SEi is the t-statistic and the standard error of the coefficient of interest 
of the i study, Zk are the K moderator variables and vj is the error term.10  
 
4. Meta-analysis and Results 
Our first task is to test for the presence of publication bias. Usually, publication bias 
arises in literatures characterized by consensus (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2008). In 
these cases researchers “search” more in order to obtain more significant results, and 
editors and researchers are more reluctant to publish “unconventional” results. Given that 
the literature on the effect of globalization on capital taxation is characterized with highly 
conflicting results, publication selection may not be an issue here.  
To establish that are results are not plagued with publication bias, we follow Stanley 
(2008) and Efendic et al. (2011) and use the Funnel Assymetry Test (FAT) to test for the 
presence of publication bias. FAT estimates equation (1), assuming that all ak are zero, 
i.e. no heterogeneity effect and tests the null hypothesis  H0: β0=0. A non- rejection of the 
null implies absence of publication bias. A non- zero constant term on the other hand 
implies upward or downward bias (depending on whether β0 is positive or negative 
respectively) on the effects estimated in the literature.11 The results of the FAT test are 
presented in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3, here] 
 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that in equation (1), a no longer corresponds to the “true” effect. The “true” effect 
depends on the moderator value categories and is different across studies (see Doucouliagos and Stanley, 
2009).  
11 Another way to examine the presence of publication bias is to use the funnel graph (Stanley, 2005). As 
this is only a graphical indication, it is an indirect way of examining publication bias and formal testing (as 
the FAT) is required. However we have plotted the funnel graph and it seems symmetric, as required in 
order to reject the presence of publication bias (the graph is always available from the authors).   
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The FAT test clearly rejects the presence of publication bias, at all levels of relevant 
statistical significance. Moreover, Table 3 reports the “true” effect of globalization on 
capital taxation: in the absence of heterogeneity this is given by the coefficient a. As 
Table 3 indicates there is no “genuine” empirical effect of globalization on capital 
taxation. This result however should be treated with caution since the relevant literature 
concludes that there is significant amount of heterogeneity among the empirical studies. 
The existence of heterogeneity is also confirmed by our results included in Table 4. 
Moreover, in Table 4, we estimate a multivariate meta- regression model (i.e. equation 
(1)), in order to investigate the potential sources of heterogeneity in the literature.     
Table 4 reports the empirical results of the multivariate meta- regression. The R- 
square ranges from 0.19 to 0.25, implying a relatively good fit for a meta- regression 
model. Moreover the Ramsey test Reset test cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no 
ommited variables in the model at the 5% level of statistical significance.12 As individual 
regressions are clustered across studies, we report cluster adjusted standard errors.  
 
[Insert Table 4, here] 
 
In column (1), we estimate equation (1) for the whole sample. As can be seen eight 
variables turn out significant. Since the coefficients of all four dummies related to the 
measure of globalization turn out highly significant, we conclude that alternative 
measures of globalization are key determinants of result heterogeneity.13 In fact Openess, 
Quinn and the Indirect measure bear negative and significant coefficients whereas the 
                                                 
12 We have also performed a link test (Pregibon, 1980) to test the linear specification of the model and in all 
cases the model appeared correctly specified.  
13 In the multivariate meta-regression model, the “true” effect is not captured solely by the coefficient of 
1/SE but by the combination of all the moderator variables. In other words there is different “true” effect 
depending on the study characteristics.   
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KOF dummy variable bears a positive and highly significant coefficient. On the other 
hand, none of the dummy variables related to capital tax measures bear significant 
coefficients. This result highlights the fact that study characteristics related to the 
measurement of capital taxation fail to explain the heterogeneity of the empirical 
findings. Moreover, characteristics related to the structure of sample, as the number of 
countries (which turns out marginally insignificant), the year the study was published, the 
latest year in the time sample and whether the study was published in a political science 
journal turn out significant. Finally, it is interesting to note that estimations that included 
proxies of government spending in the set or control variables, resulted significantly to 
lower effect of globalization on the tax burden of capital. This suggests that when one 
takes into account the positive effect of globalization on government spending (Rodrik, 
1999), the effect of higher economic integration on the taxation of capital is more 
consistent with the “efficiency hypothesis”.    
In Columns (2) to (4) of Table 4, we proceed by estimating equation (1) by: (i) 
excluding the cases where the marginal effective tax rates (EMTR) based on the 
methodology of Devereux et al. (2002) is used as capital tax proxy [Column(2)], (ii) 
excluding 5% of the most extreme values of the effect of globalization on tax rates 
[Column(3)] and (iii) excluding 10% of the most extreme values of the effect of 
globalization on tax rates [Column(4)].14 As it is evident in columns (2) to (4), our main 
results remain qualitatively intact. Differences across studies can be attributed to 
differences in the measurement of globalization whereas in contrast, study characteristics 
                                                 
14 Note that the set of variables in all columns is not the same. This is because by excluding some 
regressions from our meta- sample (i) there is no variation in some of the moderator variables, (ii) some 
variable lose their statistical significance ( and thus are dropped) and (iii) the proper specification of the 
model (as indicated by our tests) changes.   
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related to the measurement of the tax burden on capital appear to have an insignificant 
effect on the above mentioned relationship.   
 
5. Conclusions 
The main objective of the present paper was to examine whether there is any 
systematic impact of different capital taxation data and different globalization measures 
on the reported effect of globalization on capital tax rates. Our analysis provides 
empirical evidence that study characteristics related to capital taxation do not exert any 
systematic impact on the obtained results. In contrast, study characteristics related to 
globalization measures give rise to totally different findings concerning the issue under 
examination. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence that several other study 
characteristics (e.g. whether a particular study has been published in a political or in an 
economic journal) do have systematic impact on the reported results. These conclusions 
are very important for future empirical studies examining the effects of globalization on 
capital taxation  
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the studies in our meta sample 
 
  Authors Number of elasticities maximum minimum Median 
Standard 
deviation Mean 
1 Garrett, 1995 2 0.065 0.040 0.052 0.018 0.052 
2 Rodrik, 1997 3 -0.082 -14.330 -0.122 8.215 -4.845 
3 Quinn, 1997 6 0.097 0.002 0.004 0.031 0.029 
4 Garrett , 1998a 2 0.040 -0.004 0.018 0.031 0.018 
5 Garrett , 1998b 8 0.190 -0.240 -0.030 0.190 -0.019 
6 Swank, 1998 6 0.209 -0.009 0.003 0.100 0.062 
7 Garrett and Mitchell, 2001 8 0.419 -0.810 -0.017 0.379 -0.002 
8 Gelleny and McCoy, 2001 16 4.004 -5.140 0.086 1.767 0.037 
9 Bretschger and Hettich, 2002 36 0.450 -22.060 -3.475 8.279 -7.509 
10 Swank and Steinmo, 2002 8 0.143 -0.164 -0.010 0.096 -0.026 
11 Hays, 2003 3 2.223 0.212 0.988 1.014 1.141 
12 Slemrod, 2003 8 0.027 -0.056 0.005 0.029 -0.001 
13 Bretschger and Hettich, 2005 14 0.980 -10.100 -0.003 3.254 -1.699 
14 Winner, 2005 3 -0.135 -0.180 -0.145 0.024 -0.153 
15 Dreher,  2006 58 3.410 -8.230 0.300 2.779 -0.195 
16 Kenny and Winer, 2006 2 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 
17 Adam and Kammas, 2007 7 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
18 Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano, 2007 6 0.130 -0.003 0.035 0.056 0.052 
19 Clausing, 2008 5 -0.020 -0.211 -0.191 0.083 -0.145 
20 Overesch  and Rincke, 2009 14 1.740 -2.210 -1.215 1.021 -0.904 
21 Plumper,  Troeger and Winner, 2009 8 1.280 -0.045 0.010 0.511 0.267 
22 Bretschger, 2010 14 -2.178 -3.259 -2.531 0.408 -2.697 
23 Kammas, 2011 14 -0.058 -0.255 -0.140 0.068 -0.155 
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Table 2: Moderator (Meta-Independent) variables for the impact of globalization on capital taxation 
 
Variable 
 
 Description 
AETR =1 if estimation uses average effective tax rates (AETR) based on Mendoza et al., 1994 or 
Devereux et al., 2002 methodology. 
 
EMTR =1 if estimation uses marginal effective tax rates (EMTR) developed by Devereux et al., 2002. 
 
Statutory  =1 if estimation uses statutory tax rates taken by Price Waterhouse Coopers or by Devereux et 
al., 2002.                    
 
Corporate_data                 =1 if estimation uses profits and capital gains of corporations as proxy of the capital tax base. 
 
Openness =1 if estimation uses actual international trade flows as percent of GDP as a proxy of 
globalization. 
 
KOF =1 if estimation uses the overall KOF globalization index developed by Dreher (2006) as a 
proxy of globalization. 
 
Quinn                                =1 if estimation uses the qualitative index of market integration developed by Quinn (1997) as a 
proxy of globalization. 
 
Indirect =1 if estimation uses: (i) covered interest parities, (ii) saving-investment correlation and (iii) 
low wage imports as a proxy of globalization. 
 
Numb_countr                   the number of countries employed in the estimation. 
 
Earliest year Earliest year of the time sample in the study 
Latest year Latest year of  the time sample in each study 
Poljournal                         =1 if estimation has been published in political science journal. 
 
Publication year The year that the study was published 
Dynamic                           =1 if estimation employs lagged dependent variable. 
 
Spending data =1 if estimation includes controls for the level of government spending. 
Demographics                  =1 if estimation includes controls for the structure of demographics. 
 
 
 23
 
Table 3: Funnel Assymetry Test 
Dependent variable: T-stat  
  
-0.001 1/SE 
 (-0.404) 
-0.556 Constant 
(-0.869) 
observations 233 
R- squared 0.01 
F-test 1/SE=0 0.16 
Ramsey Reset test (model has no 
omitted variables) 3.73** 
Note: **, denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. Both coefficients are 
insignificant at the 10% level of statistical significance. Estimated with OLS, with cluster- robust 
standard errors; observations weighted to give each study equal weight. 
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Table 4: Meta-regressions for different combinations and study characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
4.618 5.368 6.184 7.663 1/SE (0.686) (0.732) (0.904) (1.055) 
-0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.008 Corporate_data (-0.241) (-0.164) (0.199) (0.619) 
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 AETR (0.205) (0.235) (0.180) (0.213) 
0.041  0.022 0.014 EMTR (0.719)  (0.379) (0.236) 
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 statutory (0.112) (0.152) (0.105) (0.158) 
-0.168* -0.169* -0.155* -0.151* Openness (-2.053) (-2.038) (-2.060) (-2.047) 
-0.220** -0.222** -0.208** -0.203** Quinn (-2.149) (-2.135) (-2.118) (-2.089) 
-0.157** -0.158** -0.148** -0.144** Indirect (-2.720) (-2.684) (-2.668) (-2.580) 
3.568*** 3.423*** 3.194*** 2.809*** KOF (4.587) -3.461 (6.584) (5.088) 
-0.047* -0.048* -0.045* -0.043* spending data (-1.941) (-1.925) (-1.857) (-1.797) 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 earliest year (-1.588) (-1.572) (-1.647) (-1.691) 
-0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** latest year (-2.167) (-2.132) (-2.192) (-2.186) 
0.020* 0.020 0.019 0.019 publication year (1.750) (1.717) (1.689) (1.634) 
0.114* 0.118* 0.114* 0.118** poljournal (2.017) (1.974) (2.081) (2.103) 
0.009 0.012 0.014 0.018 demographics (0.226) (0.278) (0.329) (0.441) 
0.064 0.063 0.057 0.052 dynamic (1.364) (1.313) (1.235) (1.134) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 numb_countries (1.591) (1.540) (1.453) (1.261) 
-0.629 -0.519 -0.337 -0.041 Constant (-1.096) (-0.707) (-0.957) (-0.100) 
observations 233 210 219 204 
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.27 
Ramsey Reset test 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 
 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical 
significance respectively. Estimated with OLS, with cluster- robust standard errors; 
observations weighted to give each study equal weight. The Ramsey reset test does not 
reject the null at the 5% level of statistical significance in all equations, indicating correct 
specification of the model. 
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